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ABSTRACT

Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Markets:
How Effective Is It?
Betty A. Herre
The University of North Dakota Graduate Center, 1989
Faculty Advisor:

Dr. Orville Goulet

Intervention in the foreign-exchange markets by the central banks
of the major industrial nations has been the norm for a little over 40

years.

The

level of

intervention exercised by

during these 40 years has
one extreme was the

these central

ranged from very heavy

Bretton Woods period

extensive, cooperative intervention
fixed exchange rates between

banks

to very light.

which was characterized

among central

currencies.

At

banks to

At
by

maintain

the other extreme

were

periods like the early to mid-1970's and the early to mid-1980's which
were characterized by the
most recent
through

round of

early

occasional intervention.

extensive interventions

1988.

concerted effort by

use of only

These

recent

took place

interventions

the United States,

from

represented

Great Britain, West

The
1985
a

Germany,

France, and Japan (the G-5) to force the U.S. dollar down more rapidly
than the foreign-exchange market was
the dollar 1 s

fall

required

further

driving it down.
interventions

maintain the dollar in

a certain target zone.

the G-5

to aid

was initiated

massive trade deficit.
goal.

This

the United

Subsequently,
G-5

to

The entire effort

by

Sta·tes in

by

the

correcting

its

effort was unsuccessful in reaching

its

While the United States' trade deficit with the other countries

vi

of the G-5 and
improve, the

the countries of the
U.S. trade

deficit

currencies were tied to the U.S.
States continued to run

European Economic Community

with many

of the

countries

dollar did not improve.

a massive trade deficit.

which rises in

deficit is not following

the

United

11

rules 11 of

that the U.S. dollar is a reserve

huge

foreign-exchange

country is experiencing

dollar,

a huge

the basic monetary

Possible reasons for the dollar's ability to break the

and that the United States is

The

A currency, such as the U.S.

value when the

whose

Despite this

trade deficit, the dollar began to rise again on the
markets in the spring of 1989.

did

11

trade

systems.

rules 11 include

currency for the rest of the

a profitable and safe place to

world
invest.

The existence of these reasons and the unlikelihood that they will
removed indicate that intervention on
not be very effective.

vii

behalf of the U.S. dollar

be
will

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO INTERVENTION IN THE FOREIGN-EXCHANGE MARKETS

On

September 22,

officials from the

1985, top

central bank

United States,

Japan, West

and other

economic

Germany, France,

Great Britain (the Group of Five) held a press conference to

that they intended

to work together

United States dollar.
the world

1

to drive down

This event ushered

economic community

to

and

announce

the value of

the

in the latest attempt

manipulate exchange

rates

by

between

currencies using cooperative intervention by central banks.
To

better understand

necessary to

have some

monetary systems.
flexible or

the significance

understanding

These three

floating

exchange

of the

event, it

of this

three basic

systems are the

pure gold

rates, and

various

the

types

is

of

standard,

systems

of

managed exchange rates.

The first basic monetary system is the pure gold standard.
a pure

gold

standard, each

currency

has

a fixed

price

Under

in

gold.

Because each currency is fixed in relation to gold, each currency also
has a fixed price in relation to all other currencies.

When an excess

demand for another currency occurs in one country, gold will flow from

the country which has
desired currency.
in

the country

1

the excess demand to

This outflow of
experiencing

Michael Salter et al.,

the country that has

gold will reduce the money

the outflow and

11

will reduce

Planning the Dollar's Fall,

7 October 1985, 38.
1

11

the

supply

the price

Maclean's,

2

levels and employment in that country.

This, in turn, will reduce the

demand for imports in the country experiencing the outflow of gold and

make its

goods more

attractively

priced for

The

export.

country

experiencing the inflow of gold will be confronted with a larger money
supply, higher price levels, and
the country.

This will lead to

greater levels of employment

within

a greater demand for imports in

that

country and a lower demand for exports from that country and thus lead

to greater

demand

for the

currencies

of other

countries

that

by

2

country.

While the use

of the gold

precludes extended periods of

standard nearly by

definition

imbalance between imports and

exports,

it does this at the possible cost of ''violent domestic inflations
deflations.

113

The

second of

the basic

monetary systems

flexible or floating exchange rates.
rate system, the price of
are

changes

in

internationally.
any excess demand.

the

supply

Basically,

system

Under a truly flexible

of

and

demand

the exchange rate

for

exchange
there

currency

adjusts to

eliminate

international

will rise, making items exported

in other countries.

Peter B.
Kenen,
International
Prentice-Hall, 1964), 58.

of

that

When demand for the currency in the

that country cost more

N.J.:

is the

a country's currency fluctuates when

marketplace is high, its price

2

and

from

This, in turn, will lead

Economics

(Englewood

Cliffs,

3
Sir Maurice Parsons, "Stabilizing the Present International Payments System," in The International Adjustment Mechanism:
Proceedings
of the Monetary Conference in Melvin Village, New Hampshire,
October
8-10, 1969 by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Boston: The Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970), 42.

3

to a reduction in the demand for that currency.
of

a

country's

currency

is

international marketplace, the

Imports will

begin to

available

imports will be purchased

than

price of that

cost more

thereo

4

Conversely, if
is

demanded

currency will

in

country; therefore,

However,

exports from the

fewer
country

will be less expensive in

countries, and the demand for

its exports will rise, thus

the demand for that currency.

As Daniel Pope summarized it:

the

decline.

in that

whose currency has declined in value

more

other

increasing

Thus, under floating exchange rates, the adjustment process occurs

in the international sphere, with only an indirect effect on
domestic prices and incomes .... In other words, under a floating
rate system, it should not be necessary to impose a recession in
order to alleviate a trade deficit. 5

The

third basic type

systems of

managed

of monetary system

exchange

rates.

Under

includes the
managed

various

exchange

rate

systems, exchange rates are stabilized by official intervention in the
foreign

exchange

markets,

usually

by

central

banks.

6

This

intervention can be used either only occasionally to smooth out

bumpy

changes in a currency 1 s exchange rate or it can be used extensively to
support or

force down

a

currency.

The

central banks

countries can intervene individually or cooperatively.

of

various

With a managed

exchange rate system, there may be no direct link between the monetary
7

situation within the country and the

4

foreign exchange market.

This

Kenen, 58.

5

Daniel Pope, "The United Kingdom and the Gold Standard: 1925,"
in Macroeconomic Decision Making in the World Economy, ed. Michael G.
Rukstad (New York: The Dryden Press, 1986), 389.
6

Kenen, 58.

7

Ibid.

4

is because, using the United States as an example, the Federal Reserve

Banks can hold assets

other than gold

against their monetary liabilities,

such as government

so that the

securities

money supply is

not

8

directly tied to the supply of gold.
assets to back the

Using government securities

money supply allows the

either buy govenment securites
bank reserves and stop a

on the open

as

Federal Reserve Banks
market to build

to

American

contraction in deposits and lending

because

gold has flowed out of the country or to sell government securities to

reduce bank

reserves and

stop an

increase in

lending and

deposits

9

because gold has flowed into the country.
of gold can

be counteracted by

securities, and the

Thus the inflow or outflow

the buying or

money supply

selling of

can be effectively

government

insulated in

a

managed exchange rate system.

Throughout this
being fixed
freely float

century, exchange rates have run the gamut

in relation
against

to the

one

another.

extremes has been very rare,
bank intervention

being

price of

the

exchange

norm.

the

currencies also

occurred earlier

8

Ibid., 69.
9

Ibid., 71.

occurrence

Extensive

markets to
this

of

these

use

of

manipulate

century in

to
two

central

cooperative

the

value

the form

of

of
the

Since the monetary system established by the

Bretton Woods Agreement was considered
this latest attempt by the

being allowed

however, with varying levels of

intervention in

Bretton Woods Agreement.

The

gold to

from

a fixed exchange rate

Group of Five to cooperatively

system,

manipulate

5

exchange rates

by central

bank

intervention represents

a

movement

toward more fixed exchange rates.

In view of the fact that our economy is becoming an

increasingly

global one, which of these three monetary systems is being used is
great importance

between

to businesses

various

currencies

and consumers~
determine

profitability of international

trade for

to

The

a

exchange

rates

extent

the

well as

the

large

businesses as

of

cost of maintaining the quality of life to which consumers have become
accustomed.

The domestic policies required by the monetary system

use also affect

system in

both businesses

use is

system, the level
issue.

most

and consumers.

likely some

of intervention

Therefore,

the

form

of managed

being used

efficacy of

Since the

monetary

exchange

becomes the

intervention

in

in

rate

important

the

exchange

markets is an issue of great importance to both the United States

and

the world business communities.
Since the perfect monetary

cannot agree

upon, this

paper

system is something even

will be

limited

economists

to looking

effective intervention in the exchange markets has been.

at

In order

how
to

explore this question, recent periodical articles as well as books and
articles written about the Bretton Woods period and other time periods
during this century will

be used to examine

been determined and what effect

as the trade deficit.

how exchange rates

have

intervention has had on factors

such

CHAPTER II
EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS THROUGH WORLD WAR II

To

better judge how

well intervention has

worked, it will

be

helpful to review how well the world's economy performed under the two

extreme monetary

systems --

the gold

exchange rates.

Basically, the

both a pure gold standard and

standard and

world came

freely

closest to

floating

experiencing

a freely floating exchange rate

system

in the years before World War II.

The World on the Gold Standard
''The

world's monetary system

during the 40 years

was most like

before the First World

War.

the gold

By the

standard

mid-1870's,

each major country had connected its currency to gold, establishing

fixed exchange

rate between

The basic parities between

its own

currency and

all the

a

10
others."

currencies remained fairly constant

until

11

1914.
Even during this time period,

however, the monetary system

not a perfect example of the gold standard.
paper money against its holdings

against its holdings of gold.
practice of using

The United States

issued

of government securities as well

While Great Britain did not follow

government securities as

backing for new·ly

11

Ibid., 77.
Ibid., 78.
6

as

the

issued

money as the United States did, Britain did sell commercial bills

10

was

and

7

government securities to ease or

countries did try

to use

tighten credit~

Nevertheless,

many

to reinforce
12
impact of gold flows rather than to offset their impact.
The system had

domestic monetary policy

some problems, too.

Some of the major

the

countries

manipulated their output and employment rather than allowing prices to

adjust.

Often countries at the periphery of the monetary system, such

as the raw materials producers of the Western Hemisphere, were
to bear the

brunt of

These countries

adjustments.

change their exchange rates often and

forced

were forced

had to drop away from the

to
gold

13

standard during payments crises.
After World
standard.

War I, an attempt

was made to

return to the

Great Britain re-established the gold standard in May 1925,

but was obviously having trouble maintaining its pre-World War I

parity in 1927.

rates and

gold

The United States was forced to have higher inflation

lower interest

period in order to
with the dollar.

gold

14

rates than

Great Britain

maintain the pound at

throughout

its pre-World War I

this
parity

With the United States intervening by manipulating

its domestic policies, the ''return to the gold standard'' of the 1920 1 s
was even less a true gold standard
knells for

12
13

the ill-conceived

than that before 1914.

post-World

War I

The

return to

the

death
gold

Ibid.
Ibid.

14
Daniel Pope,
"The U.S. Financial Crisis of 1931,
in Macroeconomic Decision Making in the World Economy, ed. Michael G.
Rukstad
(New York: The Dryden Press, 1986), 66.
11

8

standard were heard when Great Britain withdrew from the gold standard
15
in 1931.
There were a number of reasons for the failure of the
War I gold standard.

post-World

Among these are the fact that even before

World

War I the gold standard was not strictly adhered to since gold was not
for the U.S.

the only backing

dollar and the

British bank rate

sometimes used to counteract the effect of gold flows.

Additionally,

after World War I, more inter-government debt existed, higher
and wider use of import quotas
tremendously.

New political

major industrial countries to appeal
these new parties wielded made

unemployment to occur
New central

been

in many of

the

power

it difficult for governments to

allow

Illust under a

created in

central banks were finding ways around
Finally, because

gold standard.

expanded

to urban workers, and the

as it often

banks had

tariffs

existed, and farm output had
parties had been formed

was

dollars and pounds sterling as well

true gold

standard.

several countries,

and

the rules imposed by a

many

central banks

were

all

strict
holding

as gold to back their money,

the

new monetary system was really a gold-exchange standard and not a pure
gold standard.

In addition to all these complicating factors faced by

most nations, Great Britain faced some special problems which made
even more

difficult for

Britain's major

exports

competition throughout the

15

I b"d
1 •

,

68 •

it to

of

maintain the

textiles and
international

gold standard.

coal

were

meeting

marketplace unlike

it

Great
stiff
any ex-

9

perienced in the past, and Great
the financial markets as well.

Britain had lost its preeminence

in

16

A Period of Monetary Chaos
As a result of Great Britain's withdrawal from the gold standard,

a gold outflow of
late 1931.

crisis proportions began for

managed

exchange

as most central banks would

rate system,

the

Federal

Reserve

17
responded by raising

discount and acceptance

banks of many other nations were

it

has in

exchange rates.
18

chaos."
foreign

this

rates.

The

do

Board
central

unwilling or unable to intervene

to

The world monetary system came

as

stabilize their currencies either.

close as

in

Rather than responding to this gold outflow by intervening

via open market securities operations

under a

the United States

century to

The result was that

11

experiencing

freely

floating

the 1930 1 s saw complete monetary

The currencies of many small countries fluctuated wildly in

exchange

markets

due

to

countries and waves of speculation.
standard in 1933,

trade barriers

to

protect

conditions

within

The United States left the

the
gold

1934.

Countries,

remained on the gold standard,

established

returning at a

like France and Italy who

economic

lower parity in

their

currencies

and

their

economies.

Exchange rates did not settle down again until 1936 when the gold-bloc
countries adjusted

16
17
18

their

gold

parities

Kenen, 78-79.
Pope, ''Crisis of 1931," 69.
Kenen, 79.

and

made

a

11

stand-still 11

10
19
agreement with

Great Britain

and

the United

11

States.

exchange rates had finally settled down, they were not much

When

the

different

20
from what they had been before 1931."
Despite the fact
levels after the

upheaval, five

economic community
freely floating

that exchange rates settled to nearly the

that

they could

exchange rates.

1920's and 1930's, a

years of chaos

To

not

convinced the

handle the

at least

system of floating exchange

same
world

uncertainty

one observer

rates had at

of

of
the

least

three major problems:

They create an element of risk which tends to
discourage
international trade, .. exchange
fluctuations involve
constant
shifts of labour and other resources between production for the
home market and production for export, .. [and] .. any considerable or
continuous movement of the exchange rate is liable to generate
anticipations of a further movement in the same direction,
thus
givin~ rise to speculative capital transfers of a disequilibrating
1
kind.

Views such

as these

were held

by many

and greatly

influenced

the

monetary system which came into being after World War II.

19
20
21

Ibid., 79-80.
Ib1'd . , 80 .

Ragnar Nurskse,
International Currency Experience (Geneva:
Kenen,
League of Nations, 1944), 210-211, quoted in Peter B.
Prentice-Hall,
International Economics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
1964), 80.

CHAPTER III
THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM

After World War II, the major countries resolved not to make
same mistakes which

had been made

after World War

I.

The

problems

with maintaining the gold standard had become all too apparent in
1920's and 1930's,
rates in the

The chaos created by the use of floating

late 1930's also

seem unacceptable.

made a floating

the

the

exchange

exchange rate

system

Instead, a compromise between a true gold standard

and freely floating exchange rates was settled upon.

The Bretton Woods Agreement
The exchange rate system established
known as the Bretton Woods System
Woods Agreement of 1944.

after World War I I

and was established by the

became
Bretton

Under this agreement only the United

States

was required to fix the value of its currency in relation to gold
to guarantee

convertibility initially.

signed the agreement agreed only to

dollar or to gold.
each side
agreement.

of

22

the

If this

A

The other

governments

peg their currencies to the

maximum limit of 1 percent of fluctuation

parities

so established

1 percent was exceeded,

was

U.S.

on
the

the central bank of

the

intervene.

After a

transition

22
Kenen, 81.

23 Paul Einzig, The Case Against Floating Exchanges (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1970), 13.
11

who

under

23
country involved would be forced to

allowed

and

12
period,

the

signatories

other

convertible to

gold and

were

to other

to

make

currencies.

their

Additionally,

rules

A government

could

governing exchange rate changes were established.

alter the

par value

of its

currency

approval of the International Monetary
up in the agreement,

but had to

larger changes in value.
be granted in

by up

currencies

to 10

percent

without

Fund (IMF) which was also

have prior approval

set

of the IMF

for

This approval for larger changes would

cases of

11

fundamental disequilibrium"

24
international accounts.

only

in a

country's

Because under the Bretton Woods

Agreement

currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar but could also be altered by
up to 10 percent, the Bretton

Woods System was sometimes referred

25

Essentially, then, the Bretton

as an adjustable peg system.

System was an attempt to set
which would ultimately
rate system

up a somewhat flexible system

allow the

establishment of

a fixed

Woods

initially
exchange

once the

world economy

was recovered

sufficiently

convertibility of all

currencies to

be restored.

One deference

flexibility was to

be retained after

to

for
to

convertibility was restored

the adjustable peg mechanism was to be left in place.
An explanation

of the role of

(IMF) is relevant at this point.
for post-war

Agreement,
24

26

monetary

the International Monetary

The IMF was part of "the

cooperation II

set

up

by

the

Fund

framework

Bret ton

Woods

As described by Kenen, the IMF:

Kenen, 81.

25

Richard E. Caves,
"Discussion, 11
in The International Adjustment Mechanism:
Proceedings of the Monetary Conference in Melvin

Village, New Hampshire, October 8-10, 1969 by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston (Boston:
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970), 135.

26

Kenen, 81.

13

is a pool of currencies and gold furnished by its 76 member
governments. When a country joins the IMF, it is assigned a quota
which governs the size of its cash subscription, its voting power,
and its drawing rights .... When a country encounters a payments
deficit and does not have sufficient reserves to cope with the
problem, it can buy foreign currency from the IMF in exchange for
its own currency, but it must repurchase its own currency within 5
years.
A member of the IMF can always buy foreign currency equal
in value to a quarter of its quota (the equivalent of its
initial
gold subscription),
To make a larger purchase, it must satisfy
the Fund that it is trying to lflve its payments problem, as by
controlling domestic inflation.
The establishment of the IMF, it was hoped, would ensure that external
exchange rates

would

have

some

effect

on

the

internal

domestic

policies of those countries experiencing a deficit.
In addition to establishing the IMF and setting up limits
which a

currency could

be revalued,

encompassed the General

the Bretton

Agreement on Tariffs

GATT was intended

was signed in 1947.

System was

exchange policies like
community

in

the

to

while

also

and Trade (GATT)

The intent of the

prevent beggar-thy-neighbor

those which

1930 1 s

Woods System

which

to encourage low tariffs

promote non-discrimination among countries.
Bretton Woods

within

had engulfed
allowing

some

the world
autonomy

and

entire

trade

and

economic
for

the

28
signatories in monetary and fiscal matters.

A Dollar Shortag~
The

dollar was

chosen to be

the basis for

the Bretton

Woods

System because one of the major concerns of America 1 s trading partners

27
28

Ibid., 89,

Richard N. Cooper, "Flexing the International Monetary System:
The Case for Gliding Parities," in The International Adjustment
Mechanism: Proceedings of the Monetary Conference in Melvin Village,
New Hampshire, October 8-10, 1969 by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston (Boston:
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970), 141.
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at that time was a shortage of dollars.

This fear was exacerbated

the U.S. military, economic, and overseas aid programs which
after World War II.

The United

appeared

States held nearly 57 percent of

total reserves of all the members of the IMF as late as 1949.
the comparative productive strength of
industrial nations feared

increase during

established systems

period

of import

guarantee that their

quotas

imports from

their supply of dollars.

the

Due

the U.S. economy, other

U.S. gold reserves

the post-war

the late 1940's.

to

major

would just continue

so these

recovering

and exchange

the United States

to

countries

restrictions
did not

to

exceed

Even with these quotas and restrictions, the

dollar shortage persisted and had to be handled through Marshall
aid and by heavy

by

borrowings from the

Plan

International Monetary Fund

29

In 1949 the United States

11

forced devaluations of the

European

and Japanese currencies against the dollar," causing the Japanese
to be devalued by
more than 30

in

98 percent.

percent and the

against the U.S. dollar.

30

The British

Deutsche mark by

pound was devalued
more than 20

This made goods exported by these

yen
by

percent
countries

more competitive against U.S. goods, but the earlier fears of a dollar
shortage

.
d 31
persiste .

29 .

"Until

the late

.

1950's,

foreign

Vincent G. Massaro, Transnational Money Management:
Practices (New York:
The Conference Board, 1978), 1-2.
30

monetary

Issues and

David B.
Yoffie,
"Kennedy and the Balance of Payrnents, 11
ed. Michael
Macroeconomic Decision Making in the World Economy,
Rukstad (New York: The Dryden Press, 1986), 414.
31

Massaro, 2.

in
G.

15

authorities were

far more

anxious to

obtain dollars

than

exchange

32
dollars for gold."

The Gold Drain Begins
It began to be
be feared in 1958.
from the

million.

to

In that year, U.S. exports fell by over $3 billion

prior year

33

apparent that a dollar shortage was no longer

while U.S.

imports dropped

by less

than

In addition to the problems with the U.S. current

$300

account

balance, "an increase in U.S. foreign investment in Europe and growing

dollar reserves overseas reduced the incentive for foreign governments
34
to hold U.S. currency."

By the end of 1958, •convertibility of

the

currencies of the major industrial countries into other currencies for
35
nonresidents was

restored by

return of convertibility

14 European

and the formation

Community (EEC), the Europeans had less
dollar shortage

of the

post-war

36

It became

of the European

With

into a

the

Economic

need for U.S. currency.

years turned

Foreign central banks began to demand
drain began.

countries."

dollar

gold for dollars, and the

necessary for central banks to support

The
glut.
gold
the

U.S. dollar as was proved when:
On October 20, 1960, the British stopped supporting the price of
gold on the London Exchange, causing the price to shoot up to $40
per ounce. The price was quickly reduced to official levels when
Yet
the United States provided Britain with new gold reserves.

32

33

34
35
36

Yoffie, 414.

Massaro, 2.
Yoffie, 415.

Massaro, 2.
Yoffie, 415.
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the psychological impact of breaking the official price, even
one day, was dramatic. 37
Throughout

the 1960's,

outflow of dollars.

the United

This was of major

backed by gold, and dollar holdings

States was

for

plagued by

an

concern since the dollar

was

had to be converted to gold

upon

request of foreign governments under the Bretton Woods Agreement.

In

1961 and 1962, the Kennedy Administration launched Operation Twist

in

an attempt

to promote

faster domestic

interest rates low to encourage

growth by

to limit

countries.

measure, which it

halt the outflow of funds that

long-term

more domestic investment and

short-term interest rates
An additional

keeping

the outflow of

raising

capital to

other

was hoped would

further

resulted from the use of U.S.

capital

markets by foreigners, was the interest equalization tax (IET) enacted
by Congress in 1963.
cost to

The IET was

foreigners on

prompt the

securities

development of

supposed to increase the
sold to

interest

U.S. investors

alternative capital

markets.

and

thus

Even

with

The Board

these measures in place, the outflow of dollars continued.

of Governors of the Federal Reserve System issued guidelines in

1965 which

requested

that

concerns to 105 percent

1964.

banks hold

extended

foreign
of

Foreign Direct Investment Regulations also went into effect

in

limited

the

transfer

of such credit

to

at the end

1965 which

of the amount

credit

early

of U.S.

companies to their overseas affiliates.

funds

from

U.S.

parent

38

All these restrictions and regulations failed to halt the outflow
of dollars completely,
37 Ib1'd .

38
Massaro, 3-4.

Additionally, they led to the establishment of

17
As Massaro explained it:

the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets~

The early development of the Eurodollar mark.et,
for instance,
resulted from the attempt of some Eastern European countries that
placed dollars with banks in Western Europe to avoid a possible
blockage or confiscation of funds in the United States ....• The
Eurodollar market grew from i10 billion at the end of 1965 to $46
billion at the end of 1970. 3
Because of restrictions on amounts which could be loaned in the United
States, U.S. companies and their affiliates were responsible for
of the expansion.

The

much

40

Eurobond market,

denominated in dollars and
bounds during the same

the

market

longer

other currencies, also

period.

Its value

1963 to an annual average of more than
Approximately half of

for

issues

grew by leaps

and

went from $100 million

$4 billion

that activity was

term

in

from 1968 to 1970.

attributed to borrowings

by

41
U.S. companies and their affiliates.
All these outflows of dollars wreaked havoc on the United States'
IMF reserve levels.
20 percent

of the

percent in late
... [was] due

to

By late
reserves

1958 .

42

1968, U.S. reserves had dropped to
of all

"The bulk

substantial

Fund

member countries

of the shift

increases

in

the

from

in reserve
reserves

only
39

assets

of

other

43
countries, and especially in their holdings

of U.S. dollars.

11

The

reduction in the United States' IMF reserves throughout the 1960's and

39

Ibid., 4.

40
Ibid.
41

.
Ibid.

42
Ibid. , 2.
43
Ibid.
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early 1970's had

much to do

with the collapse

of the Bretton

Woods

In the late 1960's it became fashionable for economists to

blast

System in 1973.

The Call for a Change Begins

the Bretton Woods System.
be found.

Several alternative

of exchange rates
were a

crawling

floating

Few, if any, supporters of the system could
approaches to handling the

were advanced.
peg,

exchange

wider

combinations of these

Among these alternative

bands,

rates.

management

Some

gliding

parities,

and

All seemed to

be in

freely

various

supported

economists

alternatives.

approaches

agreement

that the Bretton Woods System was flawed.
Milton Friedman, a proponent of floating exchange rates, cited as

one of the

major problems with

the Bretton Woods

System its

abrupt

44

He pointed out

rather than gradual changes in exchange rates.
of the

21 more-developed

countries,

depreciation of their currency
Bretton Woods System.
"6 had

a

Of

only 3

had not

with respect to

less

than

experienced

the dollar under

the 18 which had experienced

depreciation of

that

30 percent,

and

a

the

depreciation,
12 .... had

a

45
depreciation of more than 30

these large depreciations
under fixed

rates as

percent."

The abrupt changes due

to

showed that just as much uncertainty exists

under

floating exchange

rates.

As

Friedman

maintained:

44

Milton Friedman,

11

Panel,"

Mechanism: Proceedings of the

in The International
Adjustment
Monetary Conference in Melvin Village,

New Hampshire, October 8-10, 1969 by the Federal Reserve Bank
Boston (Boston: The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970), 19,
45

Ibid., 17,

of

19
The difference is that if you have flexible rates, the uncertainty

manifests itself

in

changes

in

the

price

of

exchangeo

It

manifests itself promptly but gradually, in a way to which people
can adjust promptly. When you have fixed rates, the uncertainty
manifests itself in exchange and trade controls, in restrictions

on what you can do, in iarge discontinuous
4
rates from time to time.
Gottfried

Haberler

agreed with

smoother adjustment mechanism.

He

changes in

Friedman on

found the

exchange

the need

for

adjustable peg

a

system

established by the Bretton Woods Agreement:
unsatisfactory, because it leads necessarily to large
flows before and after each depreciation or appreciationo

goes on, more

and more

specu1~tive flows tend

people catch on
to become

to the

larger from one

capital
As time

pattern and

the

crisis to

the

next.
Haberler supported greater flexibility in exchange rate management

a means of smoothing
flexibility did

For him, this

exchange rates changes.

as

greater

not necessarily mean that every currency in the world

would float against every

other currency.

He envisioned that

"many

small countries will prefer to peg their currencies to that of a large
country and
blocs.

11

groups

of countries

may

well join

in

fixed

currency

48

Robert Solomon

also found fault

with the adjustment

provided for in the Bretton Woods Agreement.
the adjustable peg system,

as Solomon saw it,

mechanism

The major shortcoming of
was that there was

"a

46

Milton Friedman, 11 Discussion, 11
in The International Adjustment
Mechanism: Proceedings of the Monetary Conference in Melvin Village,
New Hampshire,
October 8-10,
1969 by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston (Boston:
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970), 115.
47

11
Gottfried Haberler,
Panel, 11 in The International Adjustment
Mechanism: Proceedings of the Monetary Conference in Melvin Village,
New Hampshire,
October 8-10,
1969 by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston (Boston:
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970), 32.

48

Ibid.

20
tendency for

those who

devalue to

devalue excessively

and when
49
deficient."

an

correct this, he saw a need for a bias toward revaluation and felt
50
upward crawling peg might be a feasible solution.

an

occasional revaluation does occur,

it tends to be

Sir Maurice Parsons came closer than most economists of the
1960's

to

supporting

the

Bretton

Woods

System.

He

To

late

especially

questioned the proposed crawling peg mechanism of limiting adjustments
to plus or minus 2 percent per year.

He did this on the grounds

it was

determine

if

a

or more.

He

felt that

so

difficult

over-valued by

to

10 percent

evidence of under- or over-valuation

currency

he

felt

a

crawling

peg

would

was

under-

or

by the

time

the

was strong, the 2 percent

would prove inadequate to correct the misalignment.

increase

that

limit

Because of

speculative

this,

pressure

on

currencies even more than the Bretton Woods System of relatively fixed
exchange rates.

51

Parsons also applauded the introduction of

Special

Drawing Rights (SDR) which were:
a form of international currency issued by the International
Monetary Fund and used only by governments in place of gold as a
monetary reserve ••. [they were] established in July 1~69 by the
Group of Ten, linked to gold, and set equal to $1/SDR.
The Group

of Ten

were

Belgium, Canada,

France, Italy,

Japan,

the

49

Robert Solomon,
"Panel, 11 in The International
Adjustment
Mechanism: Proceedings of the Monetary Conference in Melvin Village,
New Hampshire, October 8-10, 1969 by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston (Boston:
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970), 36.
50
51

Ibid., 37-38.
Parsons,

50.

52 Michael G. Rukstad, Macroeconomic Decision Making in the World
Ecomony (New York:
The Dryden Press, 1986), 580.

21
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
53
Germany.

Parsons

felt

the United States, and

SDR's would help offset the

damage

West

caused

54
by the inefficiencies of the adjustment mechanism under Bretton Woods.

George

N~ Halm

advocated the use

acknowledged could vary from a
to a fixed par-value

of a widened

band which

very limited system of floating

system with widened gold

points.

he

rates

According

to

Halm:
Whether this compromise favors discipline or freedom depends on
the chosen width of the band in conjunction with the supply of
international liquidity reserves •... If international liquidity
reserves and widened bands are considered trade-offs, the latter
have the advantage that exchange-rate
variations produce real
larger reserves
only help
postpone
adjustments while the
adjustments. 55
In addition to widening the band, Halm recognized that if the exchange
rates remained at the support points for a period of time, flexibility
would be

lost, so

he

suggested combining

the

wider bands

with

a

56
crawling peg of perhaps 2 percent per year.
Richard N.

Cooper argued instead for

a gliding parity

system.

Under his proposal:
A country would be expected to change its exchange parity weekly
whenever its payments position warranted a change.
The weekly
change in parity would be fixed at
.05 percent ..• A change in
parity would be triggered
by a movement
in the
country's

53
54

Massaro, 45.
Parsons, 52.

55

11
George N. Halm,
Widening the Band for Permissable Exchange
11
Rate Fluctuations,
in
The International Adjustment
Mechanism:
Proceedings of the Monetary Conference in Melvin Village,
New
Hampshire, October 8-10, 1969 by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
(Boston:
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970), 127.

56 Ibid.
.
, 1 30 .

22
international reserve position .... A country that failed to alter
its parity when an alteration was indicated would be required to
explain and justify its decisions before other trading nations,
which would meet on a regular basis several times each year to
review international monetary developments. Any country that systematically ignored the
presumptive rules
and offered
an
57
unacceptable justification would be open to sanctions.
cooper felt this gliding parity system would provide both a

gradual

adjustment

,

mechanism
,

,

plus

,

discipline on domestic pol1c1es.
As can be

a

means

of

long-term

imposing

external

58

seen, economists were virtually all in agreement

the Bretton Woods System

Its lack of

had become unworkable.

that
smooth

adjustments in exchange rates troubled all of them, but they could not
agree on the

degree of flexibility

system to smooth such adjustments.

which needed to

be added to

It is also interesting to note the

ideas advanced by these economists in the late 1960's because
have come up as proposals for

the

several

the management of exchange rates

since

1985.

The Collapse of the Bretton Woods System
The

whole Bretton
Obviously,

dollar.

Woods System

confidence

rested on

in the

confidence in

dollar became

more

the

shakey

throughout the 1960's as the outflow of capital from the United States
continued.

The large

external

deficits run

by the

United

States

during this period led many countries to convert their dollar holdings
into gold.

This

officially close

outflow
the gold

57

Cooper, 146-147.
58

Ib1'd • ,

1 46 .

of

gold

window on

caused

the

August 15,

United

States

1971, when

it

to
was

23
announced by President Nixon that

the United States "would no

longer

allow conversion of foreign official holdings of dollars into gold.''
In an attempt to maintain a more flexible version of the
Woods System,

the

Group

of Ten

countries
60

Agreement on

1971.

December 18,

signed

the

This agreement

Bretton

Smithsonian

provided for

devaluation of the dollar by about 8 percent against gold and

It

other currencies.

also

widened the

ranges

within

or minus 1

percent of the

plus or minus 2.25 percent.

which

Bretton Woods

had to

System.

point

Bretton Woods Agreement

only until February 1973
This

be devalued.

62

the

to

61

The Smithsonian Agreement lasted
the dollar again

a

certain

exchange rates of countries could vary about their fixed parity

from the plus

59

Instead

of

marked the

this

when

end of

devaluation

the

restoring

confidence in the dollar, however, it:

led to

even greater

turbulence and

foreign-exchange markets for more than

Since the reopening

of exchange

to the

official closing

two weeks in March,

markets on March

19, 1973,

of

1973.

the

international monetary system has been one of floating exchange
rates with di~~erent degrees of
intervention by the various
central banks.

How Well Did Intervention Work During Bretton Woods?

Looking back

on the

Bretton Woods

period, heavy

cooperative

intervention worked fairly well to get the world's economy back on its

59
60
61
62
63

Massaro, 6.
Ibid.
Rukstad, 580.
Massaro, 6.
Ibid.
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feet again after

World War

The devaluations

II.

which the

United

States forced on Japan and several of the European nations in 1949 led

to these

nations becoming

more competitive

This,

internationally.

however, led to the dollar's decline as our trade surplus deteriorated
into a trade deficit.

too did gold under

As dollars flowed out of the United States,

Our

IMF reserves, likewise,

were

It could be argued

that some of this was a

good

Bretton Woods.

greatly diminished.

and necessary thing since the imbalance in favor of the United

at the end of World

so

War II was not a

good thing when looking at

entire international economy.

Basically, the

System was set

demise.

up led

to its

extremely strong dollar backed by

States

way the Bretton

It was

set up

the
Woods

based on

huge reserve surpluses and

an

equally

large trade surpluses, but by the System's very design it was intended
to diminish

these

recovering countries

reserve
of

and

Japan

trade
and

surpluses

in

favor

Western Europe.

As

expected, the Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates
collapsed as the other currencies
U.S. dollar.

of

could

the

be

eventually

gained strength in relation to

the

Continued cooperative intervention could have maintained

the System possibly, but the intervention would have needed to
domestic policies within the U.S.

and other countries much more

was politically acceptable in the late twentieth century.

affect
than

CHAP'I'ER IV
FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES -- 1973 TO 1985

With the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1973, the

entered another

period

floating exchange rate
banks practiced

a

of

floating

period of

lot

more

exchange

the late

ratese

Unlike

1930 1 s, however,

intervention

in

the

world
the

central

foreign-exchange
rates.

Some

countries responded to the collapse of the fixed exchange rate

system

markets during

this

period

of

by connecting the value of their
nations.

"floating"

exchang·e

currencies to the currency of

Throughout this twelve year period, exchange rate

varied with

conditions,

and

the use

of

intervention

other

stability

varied

from

infrequent to extensive.

The European "Snake"
In an

effort to maintain

monetary system, five of
Community

Belgium,

some stability

the six countries

the

Federal

within the

floating

in the European

Economic

Republic

of

Germany,

Italy,

64
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands
-- banded with Norway and Sweden

form

the

so-called

snake

arrangement

arrangement, these countries agreed to

in a

narrow band

64

65

with

one another

Yoffie, 413.
Massaro, 6.
25

11

in

1973.

65

Under

keep their own exchange

but

to float

their

to
this

rates

currencies

26
66
jointly against other currencies."

The various currencies of those
67

in this arrangement were pegged to the Deutsche mark initially.

Floating Rates: 1973 - 1976
A number of shocks hit
years of

1973 through

the world economic community during
In late

1976.

1973, petroleum

increased fourfold by the OPEC cartel.

was a rapid rise in agricultural
became a serious problem for
of this, leaders

of these

prices

were

At nearly the same time, there

Inflation

and raw material prices.

the industrialized nations, and
nations chose not
By 1974,

fiscal and monetary policies9

the

to pursue

because

expansionary

real gross national

product

(GNP) in the capitalist industrialized nations had begun to fall,

and

by early 1975, the world had

the

slid into the worst recession since

68
1930's.
Despite all these problems, the floating exchange rate system was

performing much better than expected.

There had been much speculation

that such conditions under a floating exchange rate regime would

to

competitive

of

depreciations

protectionist barriers

floating rate regime in

to

trade

as

the 1930's.

The dollar performed fairly well also.
summer of 1973 during a period

66
67
68

currencies

had
These

and

occurred

lead

erection
under

last

the

responses did not

occur.

When the dollar dipped in

of high inflation rates in the

of

the

United

Ibid.
Ibid.

Daniel Pope,
''The Decline of the Dollar:
1978,"
in MacroRukstad
economic Decision Making in the World Economy, ed. Michael G.
(New York: The Dryden Press, 1986), 454.

27

States and upheaval over the

Watergate affair, the United States

and

other nations intervened in the foreign-exchange markets by purchasing
dollars with

other currencies.

The

dollar responded

by rising

in

value in the latter half of 1973.

From late 1975 through late

1977,

the dollar remained within only a

few percentage points of the

value

Because

which had been set for it in the Smithsonian Accord of 1971,

the United States was less reliant on imported oil than Japan and many
of the European

countries, the

surplus from 1973 through

United States ran

1976,

a current

account

This current account surplus

probably partially responsible for the stability of the dollar

was

during

69
this time period.
Other currencies performed reasonably well during this

period also.

Only the pound

IMF to offset a

stressful

sterling required a large loan from

rapid decline in its

70
value in 1976.

As noted

the

by

Daniel Pope:
Fluctuations in exchange rates were becoming more moderate and
were apparently fulfilling their prescribed function.
When a
nation's currency depreciated,
its
international
competitive
position generally improved and its payments deficit shrank.
Similarly, as
strong currenGjies rose
in value,
their payments
1
surpluses tended to diminish.

Some disturbing problems surfaced which indicated there could be
flaws in

this floating

occasional intervention.

exchange rate
The recession

system characterized
of this time period

for all the industrialized nations almost simultaneously.
nations did not recover

69

Ibid., 454-455.

?Oibid., 455.
71

Ibid.

from the recession

by

only

occurred

The various

at the same time or rate,

28
however.

The United States recovered more rapidly and more vigorously
This, unfortunately, led to a

than did West Germany or Japan.

rapid

rise in prices for Americans and took its toll on the U.S. balance
payments as well.

of

72

The Dollar's Decline: 1977-1978
In 1977, the current account for the United States experienced

$15.3 billion deficit.
a deficit

of $13.4

Additionally, the capital account
Because

billion.

dollar holdings in West Germany,
As could be

expected, this

marketplace began

to

take

of these

its

experienced

deficits,

official

73
rose.

Japan, and the OPEC countries

surplus of dollars
toll on

the

in the
value

a

international
of

the

dollar

internationally.
The exchange rate of the

U.S. dollar began its descent

showing little movement as late as the

slowly,

end of 1977 from the level

had been at when floating rates first went into effect in March
Between March 1973

and the end

of 1977, the

it

1973.

dollar appreciated

9.4

percent against the Canadian dollar and 34.8 percent against the pound
sterling.

The

dollar

did,

however,

decline

drastically

against

several other currencies -- 25.5 percent against the West German mark,

10.5 percent against the

Japanese yen, and
74

37.9 percent against

the

Swiss franc during the same time period.
The Japanese and West Germans were the major beneficiaries of the

72

73
74

Ibid.
Ibid. , 455-456.
Ibid., 456.
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U.S. trade

deficit

with

surpluses.

The Carter administration hoped the declining dollar would

correct this situation,

both countries

but the

running

substantial

dollar's decline was

trade

slow to

help.

The Japanese were thought to be

using a "dirty float" -- selling

and buying

the

dollars

Japanese export

to prevent

competiveness would

yen

from rising

11

U.S. deficit situation did not improve rapidly.

The

to

the

commitments do

fact

that

not change

in

the

short

required to pay for the same

that

J-curve 11 effect, the

run,

but depreciation

high

Unfortunately,

be threatened.

because of such interventions and because of the

refers

so

yen

11

J-curve 11

import

means more

effect

and

export

dollars

volume of imports while export

are

revenues

75
remain stable.
Recognizing

the fact

exchange markets could

11

the underlying movement

11

Reserve had

been

that central

bank intervention

in

the

do no more than slow down -- at a high cost --

of a currency,

limited

to

intervention by the

counteracting

"short-run

Federal

'disorderly

76
market conditions', not

longer-term trends" from

The Carter administration began to
1978 by

adding a

German Bundesbank
terms of these swap

11

swap line"

to other

1973 through

1977.

reverse this policy in January

between the

existing swap

Federal Reserve
arrangements.

arrangements, each nation had

of

and

the

Under

the

a standby line

of

credit in its partners 1 currencies. By borrowing foreign currencies on
these lines of credit and then selling these currencies to buy its own

75
76

Ibid., 456-458.
Ibid., 458.
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currency, a country could raise or
own currency.

The

use immediately.

new swap arrangement with

The mere

fall

6

percent

against

interventions, the dollar

the value of dollars

the

U.S.

in relation to gold.
The

these

passed.

each month to

Carter 1 s Federal
use of

franc

Despite

again as time

by selling gold

, h
,
, , 77
t1g ten1ng creo1t.

respon d e d b y

dollar.

to

would

fall 4 percent and the Swiss

began to slip

Carter administration responded

its

the Germans was put

announcement that such intervention

be used caused the German mark to

to

support the exchange rate for

The
raise

Reserve

these two

measures

it became apparent that stronger

measures

failed to halt the fall of the dollar.
By the fall of 1978,
.were needed

to stop

the dollar's

fall.

The Carter

administration

responded in November of 1978:
The Treasury and the Fed[eral Reserve] extended their swap
arrangements with the German,
Swiss and Japanese
monetary
authorities by $7.6 billion.
This more than doubled the swap
lines with these three strong currencies (from $7.4 billion to $15
billion). Total swap line limits reached $30 billion. In early
November,
the
Fed[eral Reserve]
used
these
resources
energetically.
Between August 1, 1978 and January 31,
1979,
American official foreign exchange sales (designed to support the
dollar) came to $9,359.1 million.
(Of this, $8,122.9 million was
in marks.)
The intervention level was more than six times as high
as in the previous half year and was most active in the early days

of November.
Three

78

billion dollars

intervention on behalf

of the

of

additional

funds

dollar were obtained

from the U.S. reserve account at the IMF.

earmarked
by a

for

withdrawal

Another two billion dollars

77Ibid.,
.
45 9 •
78
Daniel Pope,
"The Decline of the Dollar:
1978 -- Supplement, 11
Harvard Business School teaching note 9-384-172 (Boston: HBS Case
Services, 1984), 356.
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were made available for
at the

IMF to

billion

intervention by selling American-owned

Germany, Japan

dollars

could

be

and Switzerland.

raised

by

the

sale

Still
of

another
U.S.

securities denominated in strong foreign currencies overseas.

In addition

SDR's

Treasury
79

to preparing for strong intervention in the

foreign

exchange markets, the Federal Reserve, with the support of the
administration, raised the discount rate.

ten

Carter

In a final move:

the Treasury raised the level of gold sales to at least 1.5
million ounces monthly, a fivefold increase. The foreign exchange

markets perceived these actions as being exceptionally strong
measures.
The intervention succeeded in halting the decline of
80
the dollar through late 1978 until mid-1980.

The European Response to Floating Rates in the Late 1970's
The European
the European

11

snake 11 arrangement of the early 1970 1 s evolved into

Monetary System

(EMS)

in the

late

1970's.

The

represented to its member countries a way to fix exchange rates
themselves in order to
in

response

to

"avoid price-level instability from

transitory

exchange-rate fluctuations.

11

81

monetary

disturbances

among

occurring

reflected

Exchange rates among these

EMS

in

countries

were fixed in two respects:
First, an absolute limit of 2.25 per cent divergence from central
rates (except for Italian lira, which has a limit of 6 per cent);
and second,
a limit for each currency against the ecu,
which
itself is based on a basket of EEC currencies.
When either of
these limits is crossed, the countre of the currency concerned is
expected to take corrective action. 2
79
80

Ibid., 356-357.
Ibid., 357.

81 Jaleel Ahmad,
Floating Exchange Rates and World Inflation (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 211.
82

Ibid., 99.
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Just how effective this exchange rate fixing mechanism was can be seen
from the

experience

of the

September 1980 when the

EMS

ing its member currencies

dollar's

11

83

in such a

to engage in

narrow band at

the

EMS

and

against

a time when

heavy intervention to

prop the

rates in a more favorable

intervention levels required
high for

band were

1979

The success of the EMS at maintain-

floating" rate cast fixed

Even if the

March

average change in EMS exchange rates

the ecu was only 1.3 per cent.

U.S. was required

countries between

to maintain

countries, their

the

U.S.
light.

this

narrow

exchange rates

were

certainly far less volatile than the dollar's during this time period.

Floating Rates in the Early 1980's
From March 1980 through February 1981, heavy intervention in
foreign-exchange markets by the United

States continued~

The

the

dollar

responded:

In March 1980, the Carter administration, under the Credit Control
Act of 1969, imposed credit controls. The tightening of monetary
policy and the sharp rise in U.S. interest rates resulted in an
initial dollar appreciation.8 4
Due

to

a

recession

in

1980

which

did

not

lower

inflationary

expectations and the Federal Reserve's continued policy of restricting

the

growth

of

reserves

and

raising

appreciation of the dollar occurred.

interest

rates,

further

By February 1981, the dollar had

risen 6.4 percent on a trade-weighted basis from its March 1980 level.

83
84

Ibid. , 94.

Michael L. Bagshaw and Owen F. Humpage,
"Intervention,
Exchange-Rate Volatility, and the Stable Paretian Distribution, 11
~W~o~r~k~i~n~g,__P~a""'"p~e~r--'8~6~0~6~ (Cleveland: The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
1986), 4.
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Gross

intervention

billion.

transactions

had

totalled

approximately

$14

The majority of the dollar purchases occurred in April, May,

and June of 1980.

85

During the period from April 1981 through March 1982, the
States did not

intervene on

behalf of the

United

dollar, although

foreign

U.S

interest

rates remained high while weak economic activity abroad kept

interest

central banks

increased their

rates abroad from rising.

dollar

The United States

under control, and the U.S.

countries.

to other currencies

U.S. economic activity

interest rates

however, the

began

because, despite
interest

the

to

in the late

began to

inflation

still

favored

Additionally, European economic activity
balance, the trade-weighted

depreciated
as

rates were expected

to

This

interest

the

summer of 1981

rise.

rally again.

declining U.S.

spreads

rate

The dollar

slowed, U.S. interest

decline, and foreign
dollar

began to get

current account improved relative to

current accounts of many European
some in relation

interventions.

rates,

investments

By late
rally

1981,

occurred

international
in

dollars.

,
.
86
was still sluggish.

dollar appreciated

13.8 percent

between

87

April 1981 and March 1982."
the value of

Credit for part of the appreciation

dollar which began

in 1981 is

from the restrictive monetary policy

attributed to the

under Carter and Volcker to
88
more expansionary fiscal policy under President Reagan.

85

Ibid., 5.

86

.
Ibid., 5-6.

87

,
Ibid., 6.

88

Pope,

11

Supplement, 11 357.

in

shift
the

34
Reagan's expansionary policies caused

the U.S. economy to

boom

and the dollar to rise in the mid-eighties:
tax cuts coupled with tight money
the U.S.
That drew in foreign
capital, thereby making the U.S. a big international borrower.
The capital inflows, in turn, pushed up the value of the dollar.89

The Reagan policy mix of large

pushed up

interest

rates in

Because of the low inflation rates and relatively high interest

rates

in the United States, the dollar continued to rise until it peaked
February of 1985.

90

could be expected.

The

strong dollar led to huge trade deficits

The

U.S. merchandise trade

billion in 1983 and $110 billion in 1984.

91

deficit reached

in
as
$60

Support for protectionism

92
was definitely gaining momentum.

The Administration and the Federal

Reserve were reluctant to intervene

in the exchange markets to

the dollar down because they were afraid such a move

11

huge inflow

finance the

of foreign

capital that

[had] helped

drive

would dry up the
U.S.

93
budget deficit.

11

How Effective Was Intervention Between 1973 and 1985?

Technically, this question should not even be asked since,

under

pure floating rates, intervention should not be occurring.

As can

seen from

is

this

period, a

truly

floating exchange

rate

be

nearly

89

11
Alan s.
Blinder,
Reaganomics Made the Trade Gap Inevitable,
Business Week, 20 May 1985, 42.

11

90
Barbara Rudolph,
1985, 55.

11

Dropping the Other Shoe,"

Time, 9 September

9111 s1owing Imports," Fortune, 4 March 1985, 43.
92
93

Rudolph, 54.

Edward Mervosh and Karen Pennar, 11 Yes, the Dollar Is Down.
It Won't Do Much Good," Business Week, 19 August 1985, 53.

No,
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impossible in our
their respective

The governments of

current worlda
central banks

cannot seem

to let

the world
go and

and

let

the

market determine the value of their respective currencies.
During the

period from the

markets in March 1973

until the end of

but only occasionally.
introduction in

Floating rates,

early 1973,

textbook fashion.

re-opening of the

seemed

foreign-exchange

1977, intervention was
after their initial

to be

functioning in

used,
chaotic

nearly

a

Despite the oil crunch, the world economy responded
However, the western industrialized

well to floating rates.

went into recession simultaneously

in 1975, and

nations

the world reached

a

Those

low in economic activity not quite as severe as in the 1930 1 s.

who distrusted floating exchange rates were probably ready to point to
the lack of stability

in exchange rates as

the cause for the

slump.

Before this could happen, though, the United States began to pull

out

of the recession.
Unfortunately, acting

as the "locomotive 11 for the world

economy

caused a repetition of the same problems that had led to the demise of
the Bretton Woods System.

The United States began to experience trade

deficits and with them a drain on reserves.

in late 1977.

In response

to this

The dollar began to

fall of the

dollar, the

fall

United

States entered a period of heavy intervention to prop the dollar which
began in 1978 and continued until just after Reagan entered office
1981.

A

recession,

restrictive

massive interventions in the

domestic

with foreign

were all

stop the

intervention belied

policies,

foreign-exchange markets by the

Reserve in cooperation
necessary to

monetary

central banks

dollar's fall.

the description

of

via "swap

This

and

Federal
lines 11

heavy use

"floating" attached

in

to

of
the

36
monetary regime

time periodo

during this

All

these

interventions

finally paid off by stopping the drop of the dollar by early 1981.
Because of inflation, the
restrictive domestic policies.

Carter administration had engaged
With inflation somewhat under

control

because interest rates remained high, the Reagan administration
to engage in

more expansionary

increased military

foreign

capital

spending.

so

that

domestic policies like
The

high

according

to

interest
one

in

chose

tax cuts

and

rates

attracted

economist,

"foreign

investment in the U.S. made possible the non-inflationary boom of 1983
and early 1984."

94

Since the dollar was

rising and the economy

was

growing without a recurrence of inflation, intervention was not deemed
necessary during this period by

the United States.

Intervention

only considered after the huge trade deficit, which the strong

was

dollar

had created, prompted a rise in protectionist sentiment.
Based -on the experience of
exchange rate

system,

intervene very little

but were
falling.

likely

to

it

appeared that

countries

when their currencies
intervene heavily

Interventions, when

market trends, tended

these twelve years under a

to be

when

they were

were

their

used to

floating exchange rate

in the

system was lost

to

rising,

currencies
counteract

massive and required

should occur

likely

were stable or

were
strong

the assistance

domestic policy interventions to gain the desired effect.
that adjustments

floating

of

The benefit

international sphere

under

when heavy intervention

a

took

place because domestic policies had to be adjusted.

94

C. Fred Bergsten,
Fortune, 5 August 1985, 106.

11

The

Trade Deficit

Could Be

Ruinous,"

CHAPTER V
THE GROUP OF FIVE AND THE EXCHANGE MARKETS

In the summer

of 1985,

the United States

After over

rising sentiment of protectionism.

was projected to
still resisting

the abolishment

States goods and services.

that the

strong dollar

million manufacturing

95

of their

deficit

trade barriers

to

were

United

It was estimated by Data Resources,

and resulting
jobs

banks,

The Japanese

by year's end.

in the

trade imbalance

United

States.

had cost

96

a

floating

The merchandise trade

a post-war high.

be $150 billion

12 years of

of intervention by central

exchange rates with varying levels

the dollar was near

was experiencing

In

Inc.
1.5

addition,

97
agricultural exports were in a slump.

Group of Five Exchange Rate Intervention Begins
The Reagan administration knew some action would have to be taken
or a new

begin.

spurred on by

trade war,

protectionist legislation,

might

This action came when:

On

Sunday,

Sept.

22,

[1985]

top

central

bank

and

economic

officials from the Group of Five -- the United States,
Japan,
Germany, France and Great Brita.in -- held a press conference
in
New York City's Plaza Hotel.
There they announced that in order

95

Lee Walczak et al.,

11

The New Trade Strategy,

11

Business Week,

7

October 1985, 92.
96

Eric Gelman

September
97

et al.,

11

Tremors of

1985, 67.

Walczak, 92.
37

a Trade War,

11

Newsweek,

9

38
to avoid an international trade war they intended
concert to drive down the value of the U.S. dollar. 98
With obvious forethought, the

Five (G-5) the

day before

trade 11 program

calling fpr:

announcement was made

act

in

by the Group

of

President Reagan announced

to

his new

"fair

government-initiated complaints against unfair trade practices;
speeded-up processing of 'injury' claims by domestic industries;
tighter rules against copyrighting and counterfeiting; a $300
million war chest to allow the Export-Import Bank to counter
foreign subsidies; and a push to convene a new round of trade
talks under the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (GATT). 99
This two-pronged approach

was deemed necessary

Reagan 1 s veto on

the major

some of

trade bills

It was hoped that

September of 1985.

would cause the United States' trade

level in the latter part of the
the trade

deficit

was

President

before Congress

the devaluation of the

able

lower

Only a drastic reduction
to

permanently

put

in

dollar

deficit to drop to a much

1980's.

thought

to sustain

out

of
the

protectionist fires.

The dollar responded dramatically.
intervention, the

greenback plunged

foreign currencies

the

mid-January of 1986 when

day after

"Pushed by heavy central-bank

by more
the

against major
100
dollar announcement."
By

the Group of Five

than 5%

met again in London,

dollar had fallen

19% against the

West German mark.

Members of the Group of Five seemed satisfied

the progress made up

to that point.

98

Michael Salter
et al.,
Maclean•s, 7 October 1985, 38.
99
100

Walczak, 92-93.
Ibid., 90.

Japanese yen and

17% against

the

Dollar's

the
with

Leonhard Gleske, a director

''Planning

the

of

Fall,"

39
the Bundesbank, expressed the belief that Germany would do no more
that time to cause a further decline of the dollar.

at

101

The Need for Further Intervention
The dollar did, however, continue its decline against the yen and
the mark.

The Japanese especially began to worry that the dollar

had

fallen far enough and intervened in the exchange markets in the spring
of 1986 to try to maintain the

meetings involving

dollar at 180 yen.

top finance

ministers

Several

and central

important

bankers

took

place in this time frame -- an April 7-11 meeting of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, D.C.; an April 16-17 meeting of the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris; and

May 4-6 meeting of the Group of Five with representatives from
and Italy in

On the

Tokyo.

concept of ''target

agenda at

zones'' for

all these

the various

Canada

meetings was

currencies.

102

a

The

the
Tokyo

summit, which ended with an agreement among the seven major industrial
powers to
valuation,

move

toward

the

was

hailed

as

administration.

103

Secretary Baker,

a

success

target
for

zones

Baker

and

for
the

currency
Reagan

The plan, presented at the Tokyo summit by

Treasury

key

economic

suggested

indicators including

101

concept of

Edward Boyer,

the

use

inflation and

11

of

a

growth

group

of

rates, trade

and

The Attack on the Dollar Is Over,"

budget

Fortune,

3 March 1986, 65.

102

Blanca Riemer,
"Now, a Real Global Try at Stable Currencies,''
Business Week, 14 April 1986, 42.
103

Richard Fly et al.,
"Reagan
Business Week, 19 May 1986, 42.

Scores

Big

at the

Summit,

11

40
deficits, and

currency values

within their target zones.

if exchange

to determine

of these indicators would

present the results

of their study

International Monetary Fund.

be most effective

at the September

meeting of

talks

however,

waffled on the budget deficit

failure to

between

the

members

International

progress toward

Monetary

Secretary Baker to begin

Fund
11

administration

the

use

meeting

backroom

their countries.

rates in

of target

led

a

dealing."

in
the

of

issue and European and Japanese

lowering interest

make

the

the International Monetary Fund

International Monetary Fund deteriorated as the Reagan

bickered over

and

104

At the September meeting of
D.C.,

were

Experts at the International Monetary Fund

were to study which

Washington,

rates

allies

105

zones

His

at

the

Treasury

determined
Baker met with

success

on October 31, 1986, when "in return for a U.S. pledge to stop driving
down the

dollar, export-dependent

agreed to adopt new tax cuts.

106
11

Japan reduced

interest rates

and

The Baker-Miyazawa pact put Baker in

the position to pressure West Germany to get its economy moving faster
or face an alliance between Japan and the United States.
actions were

aimed at

increasing demand

for American

107

All

these

exports in

a

104
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Blanca Riemer,
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105
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Business Week, 13 October 1986, 42.
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41
faster growing Japan and

West Germany.

This,

would reduce the United States trade deficit.

in turn, it was

hoped

The Germans refused

to

be moved, however.

The Dollar's Fall Becomes a Weapon

Even with

dollar continued

its

of not keeping

its

end of the bargain by allowing the dollar to fall from 164 yen to

154

decline.

the Baker-Miyazawa

The Japanese

pact, the

accused the United States

yen, and the United States accused the Japanese of offsetting most

the effect of

the income tax

cut they

had agreed to

of

by imposing

a

108

value-added tax

at the

same

time.

With

the breakdown

of

the

Baker-Miyazawa pact obvious by January 1987, the Reagan Administration
seemed willing to let the dollar continue its descent against the
and mark to

get the message

must stimulate

through to Japan

their economies

lower American dollar.

or face

and Germany that

the consequences

of a

yen
they
much

The tactic worked:

Two days after the dollar skidded to a postwar low of 149.98 yen
in Tokyo,
Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa jetted to
Washington for emergency talks with Baker ... A cut of half a
percentage point in the Bank of Japan's discount £~te, to 2.5%,
1
was widely expected to result from the conference.
Even

the

Germans

seemed

to

be

touched.

"Germany's

18-member

Bundesbank Council prepared to meet amid expectations that the central
bank would reluctantly reduce

the German discount

rate from 3.5%

to

110

3%.

The Germans, however, to show their resentment at the pressure

11

108
Fall,

11

Blanca Riemer and William Glasgall,
Business Week, 2 February 1987, 29.

109
110

Ibid. ,
Ibid.

28.

"The

Risks

of a Free-

42

the United

States was

requirements of their

putting on

them, also

banks, thereby

could lend to corporations.

increased the

reducing the

reserve

amount the

banks

the dollar,

Baker

111

Another Attempt at Target zones
Using

the threat of

further devaluation of

approached the February 1987 meeting of the Group of Five nations from
what he hoped

commitment from

was a position

the

Group

of Five

bankers to the idea of target
been advanced at the Tokyo

finance

to get a

ministers

and

firm

central

zones for currency valuation which

summit of May 1986.

adoption of a system of target
values would be

His aim was

of power.

112

Baker's hopes

or "reference zones in which

allowed to fluctuate

had
for

currency

only within determined

limits

11

113

were dashed again.

All the Group of

Five agreed to in the

Louvre

Accord was a temporary pledge to defend the dollar if it slipped below
1.75 marks

or

145 yen.

measures were promised

Additionally, a
by Germany

few

and Japan.

limited

114

stimulative

In their

official

statement, the Group of Five allowed that:
Further substantial exchange rate shifts among their currencies
cou.ld damage growth and adjustment prospects in their countries.
In current circumstances, therefore, they agreed to cooperate

111

Rich Thomas,
2 February 1987, 45.
112

,

"Double-Talk

Michael Meyer and
Newsweek, 2 March 1987, 53.

,

Rich

on

Thomas,

the

Newsweek,

Dollar,"

"Taming

the

.

Wild

Buck,

11

113 Blanca Riemer
.
. Pact May Not Buoy the Dollar
11
et al.,
Th e Paris
for Long," Business Week, 9 March 1987, 40.
114 I b"1 d . ,

41.

43
closely to
levels. 115
The

in

11

foster

current

stability

to exchange

circumstances" points

out

rates

around

that no

new

current

long

term

agreement on currency stability resulted from the February 1987

Paris

meeting.

The Louvre Accord Falls Apart
Exchange rates remained

relatively stable

early summer of 1987 as foreign

through spring

and

central banks intervened to keep

the

dollar from falling.

It is estimated that

Great

from

Britain

spent

$52

to

$100

West Germany, Japan,

billion

by

October

1987

These interventions hurt

intervening in the currency markets.

and

their

economies by creating inflationary pressure because of the increase in
domestic money

supplies and

declined in value anyway.

the

loss on

investment as

the

dollar

116

With the stock mark.et crash of October 19, 1987, all attempts
holding to the Louvre
Greenspan was

Accord ceased.

compelled

lowered interest

rates

pressure on the dollar.

to boost
by 1.5

117

the

Federal Reserve Chairman

money supply

percentage

which

points and

put

at
Alan

in

downward

"Less than two weeks later the president of

Germany's central bank, Karl Otto Poehl, pronounced rate pegging

or less officially dead in a New York speech that virtually

115

..
"Finance M1n1sters Meet on Exchange
State Bulletin (April 1987): 32.
116

Robert Ea Norton,
7 December 1987, 39.

117

Ibid., 39-40.

turn

11

Rates,

11

more

ridiculed

Department

of

The Dollar: How Low Should It Go?" Fortune,

44
James Baker."

118

In addition, Poehl denounced Baker's idea to tie

value of currencies to

including gold.

119

the price of a

market basket of

commodities,

The other members of the Group of Five joined

Germany in ignoring the

West

Without the intervention

of

fell drastically, settling at a low

of

Louvre Accord.

the Group of Five, the dollar

the

1.57 marks and 121 yen to the dollar by the end of 1987.

120

The Dollar Recovers
As a

result of coordinated

central bank

intervention at

the

beginning of 1988 and two months of better American trade figures,

the

dollar rose sharply against both the yen

and the mark to 131 yen

and

At the end of March, however,

the

121
1.71 marks in February of 1988.
dollar fell nearly 5% again.
tired of

propping

up

the

122

America's major allies seemed to

dollar time

and

time

again.

have

British

Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson suggested that Washington had
"to be prepared to use interest rates to back up the sort of stability
you want to

see.

11

123

that it isn't likely

118
119

120

Likewise, the

German Bundesbank "has

signaled

to intervene unless the dollar's value

falls to

Ibid., 40.
Ibid.
"The

Dollar's Leap Year,"

The Economist (20 February

1988):

87.
121
Ibid.
122

William Glasgall

Business Week,

123

et al. ,
11 April 1988, 56.

Ibid., 57.

"Won't Anybody Help

the

Dollar?"

45
1 60 marks."

124

The Bank

o

of Japan also was

intervening further to support the dollar.

The Group of Seven,

125

again in April 1988 and

their desire to stabilize currency marketso

trade figures were released in late

put their words into action by

dollar.

127

126

the

reaffirmed

When the February

1988

April, the Group of Seven had

once again intervening in the

Their intervention

to

foreign

only slowed the decline of

the

In spite of these ups and downs and interventions, however,

Business Week
11

about

as the Group of Five became known after

addition of Canada and Italy, met

exchange markets.

not terribly firm

reported in

remarkably stable 11

Finance Ministers

July

that the

dollar had

since early

January~

It also

from

the

seven

gathered at the Toronto summit

largest

actually
noted that

industrial

nations

were spared the familiar worries

the dollar that had marked earlier meetings."

been
11

the
who

over

128

Has This Latest Intervention Reduced the Value of the Dollar?
Whether an intervention is perceived
the effect sought.

Obviously,

to have worked depends

the latest interventions to drive

on
the

dollar down worked against the mark and yen -- perhaps too well.

The

subsequent interventions to

and

German

124
125
126
127
128

central

banks

prop the

attest

to

dollar up by

that.

Later

the Japanese
interventions

to

Ibid.
Ibid.
Barbara Rudolph, "Punch in the Eye,

11

Time, 25 April 1988, 59.

Ibid.

Mike McNamee, Dh, Dear, Where Should the Dollar Be?
~ ' 4 July 1988, 117.
11

11

Business

46
stabilize the dollar were not so successful.

The dollar continued

to

fall against the mark and yen despite numerous heavy interventions

by

central banks.

Another

problem

vention is that the

with determining

the

effectiveness

decreases in the dollar's

of inter-

value are measured

by

traditional indexes such as the Federal Reserve Board's daily index of

the dollar versus ten major currencies
mark and the yen.

which is based heavily on

These indexes largely ignore Canada, Mexico,

.
Korea, Taiwan,
Hong

.
129
Kong, an d Singapore.

indexes are weighted according to trade

Additionally,

11

the
South

the

patterns of the mid- to

old
late

1970s and also according to the importance of each currency in total
130
world trade."
The problem with this weighting is that Canada is not
a big player in world trade but is the United States' biggest
partner.

131

To solve

developed based

on

these problems, several
more current

somewhat different picture of
February of

1987 when

dollar as having

the

declined by

Reserve

declined only 22 percent from

12911
130
131

how much the dollar

40 percent

These

has declined.

Board index

from its

showed

peak in

Atlanta,
its peak.

showed that

the

Ibid.
Ibid.

In
the

with
had

includes

rather than 10 -- among these 18 are

Measuring the Dollar,•• Fortune, 10 November 1986, 52.

a

February

dollar

Rosensweig's index

been

show

Jeffrey A. Rosensweig, an economist

Bank of

currencies of 18 countries

new indexes have

patterns.

Federal Reserve

1985, the index prepared by
the Federal

trading

trading

Hong

47

Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia,
and nine European nations~

132

Still another index has been

developed

by W. Michael Cox, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Cox's index

includes all

States.

February 1987 Cox's

In

131 countries

with the

United

dollar had

fallen

Therefore, the

answer

index showed the

only 3 percent from its peak in
to the question of

that trade

early 1985.

whether or not this

133

latest round of

the value of

intervention

has really ·Worked

even to reduce

the dollar cannot

be

clearly answered.

It does appear intervention can affect the dollar's

value against specific currencies but it cannot cause the dollar to be
universally devalued.

Has the Dollar's Recent Decline Affected the Trade Deficit?
Perhaps a

more fruitful approach to

answering the question

of

whether or not this latest round of interventions has accomplished its
intent is to look at its
Trade deficit

effect on the United States' trade

statistics must

Street generally

follows and

be

viewed with

reacts to

deficit.

some caution.

the monthly

There are a number of problems with that approach.

trade

Wall
figures.

For one thing, the

monthly trade figures released by the Census Bureau are not seasonally
adjusted.

Likewise, the

15% or more

of a given

monthly figures often do
month's imports.

not include up

Therefore, the

to

seasonally

adjusted quarterly figures provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis

132
Roger Thompson,
Business ( February 1987):
133

Ibid.

Rise
9.
11

and Fall

of the Dollar,"

Nation's

48
are a more reliable source than either the preliminary or the

revised

134
monthly trade figures.

For the year ended 1985, the merchandise trade deficit was $148.5
billion.

135

It

was the

deficit and

the

rising protectionist sentiment in the United States that prompted

the

action taken

by

the

September of

1985.

threat of this

Group of
It

was

Five
hoped

drastically improve the trade deficit

huge trade

to

drive the

that

a

dollar

cheaper

down

dollar

would

by increasing exports from

United States and decreasing imports to the United States.

in

the

Economists

warned that, even though the dollar had begun to depreciate during the
fourth quarter of

1985, the

show up in a reduction

effects of that

of the trade deficit

depreciation would
before 12 to 18

not

months.

This was because of an economic theory explained earlier in this paper

and known as the J-curve.
because import

prices

Simply stated, the J-curve theory said that

would rise

change their buying habits as
before it improved.

136

quickly

but consumers

would

quickly, the trade deficit would

Therefore, the

1986 were the first ones which

not

widen

fourth quarter statistics

should have shown some improvement

for
in

the trade deficit.
When the fourth quarter trade figures for 1986 became

available,

they showed real export volume had increased by an annual rate of

134
Edwin A. Finn Jr.,
(26 January 1987):
34.

11

0f Apples, Oranges, and Toyotas, 11

135
c1ayton Yeutter,
"U.S. Trade Policy and the Trade
Department of State Bulletin (April 1987):
23.
136

16%

Forbes

Deficit,

11

11
Joan Berger,
The Falling Dollar Has Thrown the Trade Deficit
11
a Curve, Business Week, 11 May 1987, 68.

49
in the fourth quarter, up

During the

the third quarter.
volume had fallen.

137

The

the time frame predicted
fit the

from an annual rate

1986 but

1986, however,

by the J-curve.

Imports, however, did

Instead, imports

it was

not possible

rose during
to tell

the

in

export

improvements in the export figures came

J-curve theory.

quarter of

first half of

of increase of 13%

in
not

fourth

whether that

was

caused by price increases brought about by the dollar's devaluation or
.
.
138
b ya h igher volume of imports purchased.

The final figure for

the

. .
.
. .
139 Obviously,
.
mere h anise
tra d e d eficit
in
1986 was $ 170 b1ll1on.
d·

the

trade deficit had not staged a decisive turnaround after 15 months

of

a cheaper dollar.

It

The overall trade

was hoped that the $170

gap had, in fact, worsened.

billion trade deficit represented the

bottom

of the J-curve.
In the first

quarter of 1987, however,

imports declined at

an

140

annual rate of 8. 8%.

"Prices of imports other than petroleum

at a 10% pace in the first quarter.

rose

That means the shrinkage, in real
141

terms, was much greater than the drop in dollar value.

11

The decline

in imports was greatest for those items from Western Europe and Japan,

while imports of items from such countries as South Korea, Taiwan, and

137
James C. Cooper,
"Some Trade Numbers Are
Now," Business Week, 16 February 1987, 25.
138
139

Looking Good -- For

Ibid.

0ne Month of Trade:
Fortune, 27 April 1987, 220.
11

140

A Sampler of U.S. Exports and

Imports,"

The Falling Dollar
William B. Franklin and James c. Cooper,
Is Improving the Trade Picture," Business Week, 1 June 1987, 39.
141

11

Ibid.
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Hong Kong actually increased.
of exports to

142

Exports performed poorly.

Western Europe and

quarter of 1986 while the
remained constant.

143

value of exports to

to the

value
fourth

the rest of the

world

The fall of the dollar was helping, but only

the import situation with the
the dollar had not

Japan fell compared

The

Since

Western Europeans and Japanese.

fallen against the currencies

in

of the Pacific

Rim

nations of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, the United States trade
situation with

them remained

virtually

It seemed that the

unchanged with

large

trade

United States could not

have

both an increase in exports and a decrease in imports all in the

same

deficits the rule.

quarter.
That pattern continued

when the
those

real volume

substantially.

of imports

where

countries
144
11

to show up in the second quarter of

the

Imports from

remained high,

dollar's

value

11

1987

particularly
has

from
fallen

not

Western Europe and Japan barely

during the second quarter, and exports did poorly which is normal
the second quarter.
to be small at

145

The improvements in the trade deficit

best considering the dollar

40% according to the Federal Reserve's index.
Finally, in 1988

142
143
144
Imports,
145
146

grew
for

appeared

had already fallen

about

146

the trade figures began to improve.

The

trade

Ibid.
Ibid.
William B.
Franklin and James C. Cooper,
11
Business Week, 26 October 1987, 25.
Ibid., 26.
Thompson, 9 ..

11

That Flood

of

51
deficit shrank

11

from a monthly average

to an $11 billion average
year [ 198 8] .

11

147

Lambert Inc.,

for the three months

Richard

B. Hoey, an

predicted the

September

Including the

1988

per month.

unrevised

right

on

September

in late 1987

ended in May of

economist with Drexel

deficit would

$10.5 billion to $11 billion
figure for

of $14.9 billion

148
the

this

Burnham

stabilize at

a range

Hoey hit the

preliminary

head

figures, the

at

$10.5

trade

running at an annual rate of $137.2 billion for 1988.

149

of

billion.

deficit

was

In September,

the trade gap with Western European countries fell by $500 million

to

$880 million, the
$250 million to

trade gap with

the Pacific Rim

countries fell

by

the trade gap

with Japan fell

by

deficit figures for 1988 which were released

in

$3.1 billion, and
150

$700 million to $4.1 billion.
The final trade
February 1989 showed a

annual deficit of

annual decline in these figures since
billion, approximately 26.8

1980.

percent higher

growing sales of American-manufacured
gain in exports was
increase in imports.

Exports rose to
than in

first
$322.22

1987, thanks

products and farm goods.

large enough to more
151

$137.34 billion, the

than offset an 8.3

to
This

percent

As could be expected:

147 Kathleen Madigan, "How Long Can the Trade Deficit Keep Shrinking?'' Business Week, 22 August 1988, 20.
148

Ibid.

149

11 Trade
Deficit Falls,
16 November 1988, p. Al.

150

But So Does Dollar,''

Minot Daily News,

Ibid., p. All.

15111 Trade Deficit Declines for First
Daily News, 17 February 1989, p. AS.

Time

Since 1980,

11

Minot

52
America's largest trade imbalance was with Japan,
a deficit of
$55.4 billion, down 7.3 percent from the all-time high set in
1987. The deficit with the 12-member European Economic Community
was down even more sharply, falling 47.2 percent to $12.8 billion
for 1988.
The deficit with Canada,
the largest U.S.
trading
partner, declined by 9.6 percent to $10.6 billion. 152
A little

over three years after

Plaza Hotel in New
the major

York and agreed to

European and

narrowed a

the Group of

little.

force the dollar down

Japanese currencies,

The U.S.

against whose currencies

Five met at

the trade

trade deficits

the dollar has

the

against

deficit

with those

has

countries,

fallen most, have

improved.

The trade deficits with those countries, against whose currencies

the

dollar has fallen little, remain

the

basically unchanged.

Only with

United States' closest trading partner, Canada, has the trade

deficit

shown a percentage decline that is close to the percentage decline
the dollar in relation to their currency.

Americans still continue to

import more than they export even with higher prices for imports.
appears that

reducing the

currency of another

value of

the dollar

country does have

of

in relation

some effect on

It

to

the

the amount

goods imported from that country, but the effect is usually less

of
than

the amount of the devaluation.
This latest use of intervention to reduce the value of the dollar
has not been effective
United States.
deficit.

in solving the trade

The United States

According to

is still running

the monetary theories

systems, the existence of this massive
to force the dollar down

152

Ibid.

deficit problems of
a massive

behind exchange

trade deficit should

in the foreign-exchange markets

the
trade
rate

continue

whether the

53
United States and other countries intervene or not.
latest figures,

this has not been

the dollar began to rise again.

climbed nearly 5%

happening.

According to

In the spring of

Since April 21, 1989,

against its

11

West German counterpart

against the Japanese and British currencies.

153

the

1989,

the dollar has

and about

4%

Attempts by

central

banks to halt the dollar's rise have been ineffective through

mid-May

1989.

154

It

that

appears

foreign-exchange markets

monetary theories and
markets to

alter

is

the
not

behavior

11

of

the

easily explained

that, therefore, intervention

the value

of

the dollar

cannot

dollar
by

in

the

the

standard

in the

exchange

be

particularly

effective.

153

,
,
Michael R. Ses1t,
"Dollar Jumps to Its Highest 1n 29 Months,"
Wall Street Journal, 16 May 1989, p. Cl, col. 3.
154

Ibid.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Intervention by central banks in the foreign-exchange markets has

become a fact
With

of life in

the latter half

the rise of labor unions

of the twentieth

century.

and the unacceptability of the use

of

violent contractions and expansions of the domestic economy to correct

trade imbalances,
option.

a return

to the

With the presence of

governments to

allow

drastic

well.

a return to

For these reasons, some

seems an

unlikely

central banks and the unwillingness

fluctuations in

currencies on the foreign-exchange
the late 1930's,

gold standard

the

value

of

their

markets like those experienced

true floating rates

seems unlikely

form of managed exchange rate

of

in
as

system,

characterized by some degree of central bank intervention, has

become

the option of choice.
The world economic community has experimented with varying levels
of intervention in the years since

World War II.

Woods years,

to

the

world attempted

During the

establish a

system

Bretton
of

fixed

exchange rates.

Intervention was required by the terms of the Bretton

Woods Agreement

in order

to

maintain fixed

parities, but

amount of flexibility was built into the system.

a

small

It became obvious as

the world recovered from the after-effects of World War II that
devaluations and

revaluations would

be necessary.

large

Eventually,

the

recovery was so complete that the dollar's value fell out of line with
that of the other major currencies.

Of all the major currencies,

dollar was the only one which could not be devalued under the
54

the

Bretton

55

Woods System because
backing the

currencies

position as a
dollar

the dollar had

and

of other

a

insufficient,

and

new

the

it became necessary

agreement.

Bretton

signatories refused to

the capacity

Despite

countries.

reserve currency,
reach

joined gold in

This

Woods

System

the

of

dollar's

to devalue

proved

devaluation
collapsed

the

when

its

intervene to the

extent necessary to

support

economic community then

experimented with a

managed

the value of the dollar.
The world

floating rate system.

After

a chaotic introduction which caused

foreign-exchange markets to be
1973, floating exchange

years with only
fall and

closed for several

rates performed

massive intervention

After nearly four

Then the

to support

years of increasing

weeks in March

reasonably well

occasional intervention.

it was

dollar

policies, the
since

a

deemed

dollar

suited

Finally,

the

to

which

international

Reagan's

and intervention

expansionary
was

avoided
of

the

deficits became the

rule

political

after huge trade

and support for protectionism had
work cooperatively with

grew

With

4

necessary.

levels of intervention,

recovery.

dollar's strength

strong

administration.

began a

of

for over

dollar began

ultimately involved the domestic economy as well as the
sphere, the

the

agenda

grown, the United States agreed

Great Britain, France,

Germany and Japan

to
to

drive the dollar down by intervention.
Intervention to drive a currency
competitiveness worked well for
under the

Bretton Woods

down to improve the

country's

Japan and several European

countries

System.

Ultimately, all

these

currencies

increased in value again as the countries involved moved from having a
trade

deficit

to

having

a

trade

surplus.

The

Group

of

Five

56
intervention to drive the dollar down

has not worked nearly so

well.

The initial drive to force the dollar down was successful against

currencies of Great Britain,

It was

France, Germany, and Japan.

successful, in fact, that the dollar fell further and faster than

G-5 desired.

Efforts to

prop the

dollar back

the

up failed

so

the

miserably

perhaps because, by the very action of intervention, the G-5 destroyed

confidence in

the dollar

among speculators that
further complicate
there were

and also

created a

further such

the discussion

many currencies

interventions would
on the

whose values

dollar, and U.S. trade deficits

feeling of

to that

with those countries were

G-5, the United

In addition, the

trade deficit.

States is still

dollar has begun

To

intervention,

by the dollar's devaluation against the G-5 currencies.
intervention by the

occur.

efficacy of
were tied

expectancy

of

the

unaffected

After all the
running a

to rise in

huge
value

again in the spring of 1989 despite continuing huge trade deficits for

the United States.

This just highlights the fact that the U.S.

deficit is somewhat different than

a trade deficit for a

trade

non-reserve

currency country.
The fact that the dollar is used as a reserve currency allows the
value of the
basic monetary

dollar to

"break" the

systems.

With

rules established

the huge

trade deficits

by the

the

three

United

States has been experiencing throughout most of the 1980's, the dollar
should have fallen

drastically in value.

The fall

in the

value should not have stopped until the trade deficit was
The dollar has

not obeyed

these rules, however.

dollar's
corrected.

This is

other countries hold dollar reserves to back their currencies.
these foreign-held

dollar reserves

increase

each year,

the

because
Since
United

57

States is

forced

to

run a

'balance-of-payments

chronic

deficit.

1

155

As explained by John Mueller:
It is probably no coincidence that the official
'net debtor'
position of the U.S. ($368 billion at the end of 1987, and about
$500 billion today) approximately equals the dollar assets of
foreign central banks.
This implies that, apart from the UGS.
government and foreign central banks, Americans• books are still
roughly balanced with the rest of the world. 156
In other words, as long as the
currencies throughout the

dollar is held as a backing for

world, U.S.

trade deficits

157

are likely

As long as trade

continue into the foreseeable future.

other
to

deficits

for the United States are caused in part by the U.S. dollar serving as
a reserve currency, it is difficult or impossible to know exactly when
the dollar

is

behalf of the

under- or
dollar can

over-valued.

Therefore,

be questioned on

intervention

the grounds

that, to

on
be

effective, the correct valuation for the dollar must be known.
Herbert Stein suggests another very feasible reason for both

the

trade deficit and the recent increase in the value of the dollar:
The U.S. has a trade deficit because people in the rest of the
world invest their savings here.
This inflow of capital
is
voluntary on both sides -- foreigners are seeking the best place
to put their money and American governments and companies are
seeking the best place to obtain money.
Foreigners seeking to
invest here have to obtain dollars.
Their demand for dollars keep
(sic) the exchange rate of
he dollar at a level where U.S.
158
imports exceed U.S. exports.

155
11
John Mueller,
CPI at 7%? Bet Your Reserve Dollar,"
Street Journal, 24 February 1989, p. A16, col. 4, 5.

Wall

156
Ibid.
157

Ibid.

158
11 Don't
Worry About the Trade Deficit,"
Herbert Stein,
Street Journal, 16 May, 1989, p. Al4, col. 3-5.

Wall
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Therefore, another

way

intervention will be

profitable and

to

dollar

which would make

used effectively

to

11

obey 11

make the United

for foreigners

desirable place for foreigners to

cannot be

the

effective is to

safe place

unlikely that actions

make

the

States a

to invest.

invest will be taken,

so
less

it

Since

the United States

correct the

rules

is

less of

a

intervention

trade deficit

nor

will

forcing the dollar down necessarily be successful.
In conclusion, then, intervention on behalf of the dollar is

very effective.

It is

reserve currency for

not effective both

the rest

of the

because the

world and

place for foreigners to invest.

less effective

than desired.

value of the dollar is
Changing

would have more undesirable consequences

these two

United

change,
likely

conditions

for both the U.S. and

economies than living with massive U.S. trade deficits.

a

profitable

Unless these two conditions

intervention to change or maintain the
to be

dollar is

because the

States has traditionally been and still remains a safe and

not

world
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